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Two Billion for a Four-Billion Road: The Arithmetic Behind the Accra–Kumasi Expressway


The author is married to a Ghanaian and has been traveling to Ghana for over 25 years. He is the founder of the Ghana Net Com Network and a dedicated Pan-Africanist and free thinker. Remo Kurka is also a long-time photographer, having documented Ghana and other African countries for more than 25 years. His first website, ghana-net.com, has been online since December 2000.

Ghana 2026 · Roads · Public money · No sugar coating

Two Billion for a Four-Billion Road: The Arithmetic Behind the Accra–Kumasi Expressway

On 14 September the President announced that US$2 billion is sitting in a special account at the Bank of Ghana for the Accra–Kumasi Expressway, and that not a pesewa has been borrowed. The Finance Minister has costed that road at close to US$4 billion. So the country was shown half the money, presented as though the funding question had been settled. Meanwhile the road people actually die on is still 94 kilometres short of finished.

What was said, and when

December 2025: Parliament approves the concession agreement for a new 198.7-kilometre, six-lane Accra–Kumasi Expressway on a new alignment.

Early 2026: Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson tells a business forum that government has secured US$1 billion of the nearly US$4 billion required to build it: US$500 million from uncapped oil revenues and US$500 million from mineral royalties.

16 July 2026: the Controller and Accountant-General confirms that GH¢11 billion, about US$1 billion, has been moved out of the Consolidated Fund into a dedicated Bank of Ghana account, and that none of it has been paid to any contractor or spent on construction.

22 July 2026: Dr Forson tells Parliament that US$1.7 billion is now in the account, ring-fenced, and usable only once the main construction contract is awarded.

14 September 2026: at the handover of the cleared right-of-way at Kwaso near Ejisu, President Mahama announces US$2 billion sitting in a special account at the Bank of Ghana. "This is our own money. We have not gone to borrow money from anywhere."

Same week: Dr Forson assures the nation that the entire amount required will be available by 31 December 2026, and that not a single pesewa will be borrowed.

17 September 2026: the expressway is named as the first project to be examined by Ghana's new Value for Money Office.

Half a road

Put the cost next to the account and the sequence stops being confusing. It is a schedule. One billion in July, 1.7 billion three weeks later, two billion by September, and the rest promised by the end of the year, against a total of roughly four billion dollars.

That is not, in itself, scandalous. A government filling a project account in stages is doing something sensible.

The problem is how it was presented. On 14 September Ghanaians were told the money is ready, it is sitting at the Bank of Ghana, and money will not be the problem when the project starts.

Two billion against a four-billion road is not "the money is ready". It is half. The Finance Minister's own assurance that the full amount will arrive by 31 December says as much, and the two statements were made in the same week.

There is a second, smaller discrepancy that nobody has explained. In July the figure given to Parliament was 1.7 billion. In September the figure given at a ceremony was 2 billion. Money may well have been transferred in between, and if so that is fine. But no statement has said so, and a president rounding upward from a podium is not the same thing as a treasury movement that appears in the accounts.

The cost the Ministry has still not published

Here is the gap that matters most, and it is a documentary one.

The only cost figure in public circulation, close to US$4 billion, comes from a remark by the Finance Minister at a business forum. The Ministry of Roads and Highways has published no official engineer's estimate, no bill of quantities summary, no name for the main contractor, no procurement terms and no construction start date.

At roughly US$4 billion across 198.7 kilometres, this road works out at about US$20 million per kilometre. For comparison, the four bypasses already under construction on the existing N6, 45 kilometres in total, were awarded at GH¢1.9 billion, roughly GH¢42 million per kilometre. The expressway runs at something in the order of five times that rate per kilometre.

Those figures may be entirely justified. A purpose-built access-controlled expressway with eight interchanges, major bridges, electronic tolling, rest areas, fire stations and emergency medical facilities is a different animal from a bypass. But nobody outside government can test the number, because the number has never been published.

This is precisely the test for the new Value for Money Office, which has taken this project as its first case. Value for money can only be measured against a price. If the office reports privately, and no cost estimate is ever published, then it is paperwork rather than oversight.

Paying for it twice

One part of this deal gets very little attention and deserves a great deal.

The expressway is being delivered through Accra-Kumasi Expressway Ltd, a special purpose vehicle incorporated by the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund, classified as a state-owned enterprise, funded entirely with government money, and holding a fifty-year concession. The road will be tolled, and the Roads Minister has been open about why: the money has to be recovered, and recovery comes from tolls.

So Ghanaian oil revenue and mineral royalties build the road, and then Ghanaian drivers pay a toll for fifty years to repay money that was theirs to begin with.

Under the concession, that same company is responsible for selecting contractors and awarding construction contracts, and for supervising the works. A state-created company awards its own contracts, outside the Ministry's normal procurement chain.

That arrangement sits inside a programme with a documented procurement record. The Fourth Estate's analysis of Ministry data on the Big Push programme found that of 107 road contracts, 81 were sole-sourced and 26 went through restricted tendering, with none competitively tendered. The government's own review reported a much lower sole-sourcing share by counting all 1,441 contracts awarded since January 2025, including 896 small feeder-road jobs. Counted within Big Push alone, 117 of 140 contracts were not competitively tendered. In April 2026 the Ghana Institution of Engineers, the professional body of the engineers who build these roads, petitioned the Auditor-General for an independent audit.

The army as subcontractor

At the same September ceremony, the President directed the Roads and Highways Minister to engage the Ghana Armed Forces Engineer Regiment as a major subcontractor to the main contractor.

The military engineers had just cleared 175.6 kilometres of right-of-way in 19 weeks, a week ahead of schedule. That was done well, and saying so costs nothing.

But the Ministry has promised international competitive pre-qualification for this project, to attract technically and financially strong firms. A subcontractor named by presidential directive is, by definition, not the product of competitive procurement. What share of the work, on what terms, at what price, and who certifies it?

Readers of this site will recognise the unit. The 48 Engineer Regiment is the same formation that demolished the beachfront businesses at Laboma on 13 September. The army is being used for a great deal of civilian work this year, and that is a policy worth debating in the open rather than announcing at ceremonies.

Meanwhile, on the road that exists

Between January and April 2026, Ghana recorded 1,009 road deaths. The Ashanti and Eastern Regions, the two the Accra–Kumasi highway runs through, accounted for 481 of them, close to half of every road death in the country in four months.

On 3 August 2026, an Intercity STC bus was caught in a pile-up with an articulated truck and a saloon car at Birimso Bridge near Bonsu Junction. The Ghana Police Service recorded 12 dead and 44 injured. The bus operator publicly denied that anyone had died. No reconciled official death toll was ever published. On 13 August 2026, twelve people were killed and thirteen injured on the same corridor when two trucks, two minibuses, two cars and a tricycle collided.

The Minority in Parliament has asked government to spend US$300 million of the expressway funds on completing the unfinished sections of the existing highway. Former Roads Minister Francis Asenso-Boakye puts the remaining gap at 94 kilometres. The road sector meanwhile carries roughly GH¢40 billion in unpaid contractor arrears, with certificates outstanding since 2018 and more than a thousand projects stalled because contractors walked off unpaid sites.

A feasibility study is not a road. A design is not a road. A contract is not a road. A sod-cutting ceremony is not a road. MyJoyOnline, on the Accra–Kumasi corridor, August 2026

The people dying this month are not dying on the expressway. They are dying on the road that exists, and the fastest way to save some of them is to finish the last 94 kilometres and pay the contractors who are sitting at home.

What the government gets right

An honest article says this too.

Building a mega-project without borrowing is a real break with Ghanaian habit. This country defaulted in 2022 and only completed its three-billion-dollar IMF programme in July 2026. Funding a road from domestic revenue rather than another Eurobond is exactly what should have been done with the past twenty years of infrastructure. If government holds that line to the end, it deserves credit for it.

Ring-fencing the money is also right in principle. Ghanaian contractors have waited years for certificates to be paid, which is one reason projects stall and costs balloon. Setting money aside before construction starts is an improvement on the usual sequence, provided the money actually moves when the work starts.

The right-of-way was cleared ahead of schedule, and the corridor is not a vanity project. It is the busiest route in the country and the existing road is a documented killer.

None of that requires anyone to accept half a budget announced as a whole one.

Five questions

  • Will the Ministry publish an official cost estimate? The only figure in public is a minister's remark at a forum. Publish the engineer's estimate and the basis for it.
  • Which figure is correct, and why did it change? GH¢11 billion in mid-July, US$1.7 billion a week later, US$2 billion in September. If more was transferred, say when and from which revenue line.
  • What happens if the last two billion does not arrive by 31 December? Does construction start on half the money, and if so, what is the plan for the rest?
  • What is being given up for this? Money parked at the Bank of Ghana is money not paying the GH¢40 billion owed to road contractors, and not finishing the 94 kilometres where people are dying now. That is a choice, and it should be defended as one.
  • Who builds it, on what terms? Name the main contractor when procurement concludes, publish the procurement terms, and publish the scope and price of the Armed Forces Engineer Regiment's role.

Verdict

This article accuses nobody of lying, and it does not need to. The figures are all on the record. They simply do not say what the ceremony said they say.

Two billion dollars is real money, honourably raised and not borrowed, and that is worth something. It is also half the cost of the road it is meant to build, sitting in an account, for a project with no published cost estimate, no named contractor and no start date, while the corridor it is meant to replace takes lives every month and the contractors who could fix the existing road are owed forty billion cedis.

Publish the cost. Publish the contract. Publish what the soldiers are being paid to do. Finish the 94 kilometres. And stop presenting a deposit as a completed purchase.

Ghanaians have heard promises about this corridor for three decades. This time they are entitled to the arithmetic.

Updated and fact-checked: 18 September 2026. The statements of President Mahama at the right-of-way handover at Kwaso on 14 September 2026, the figure of US$1.7 billion reported to Parliament by Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson on 22 July 2026, his assurance that the full amount will be available by 31 December 2026, the Controller and Accountant-General's statement of 16 July 2026 on the GH¢11 billion transferred and unspent, the directive to engage the Ghana Armed Forces Engineer Regiment as a major subcontractor, and the completion of the 175.6-kilometre right-of-way clearance in 19 weeks are as reported by the sources listed. The total cost of close to US$4 billion is the figure disclosed publicly by the Finance Minister; the Ministry of Roads and Highways had published no official cost estimate, main contractor or procurement terms at the time of writing. Crash figures for 3 August 2026 are those recorded by the Ghana Police Service; the operator publicly disputed that any passenger died, and no reconciled official toll has been published. Casualty and arrears figures are as reported by Ghanaian media, parliamentary proceedings and government statements. Procurement findings are those of The Fourth Estate and of the government's own review, both recorded. This article makes no allegation that any figure was deliberately falsified and no allegation of criminal conduct against any person or company. Documented corrections will be published in full.
Written and researched by Remo Kurka · GhanaWeb-News.com